You may want to after reading Walter Scheidel’s “The Great Leveler”

Overview

Is violent upheaval a necessary precursor to creating a more equal society?

Walter Scheidel is the Dickason Professor in the Humanities and professor of classics and history at Stanford University.  In his book, “The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century” (2017), he asks, “why inequality fell, in identifying the mechanisms of inequality” (p. 10), focussing on the distribution of material resources within, not between, societies.

He argues that “Throughout history, the most powerful levelling invariably resulted from the most powerful shocks,” including warfare, revolution, state failure, and pandemics (p. 6).  He calls these shocks the four horsemen.  These four horsemen do not necessarily act independently.  Scheidel does not deny that there are feedback loops between inequality and the shocks, but the primary focus is how these shocks have reduced inequality (p. 11).

The Great Leveler is organized clearly and logically into seven parts: A brief history of inequality, war, revolution, collapse, plague, alternatives to inequality, and speculations about inequality’s future.  His approach to studying such a multifaceted question is simple for all readers to navigate, and his frequent use of academic-peer-reviewed case studies makes his case more compelling. 

So why study inequality and the greatest levellers throughout human history?  Inequality has negative consequences in both developed and developing countries alike.  Scheidel cites arguments simar to those in “Confronting Inequality” (2019) by Andrew Berg, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Prakash Loungani.  For example, he mentions how developed societies with greater inequality have reduced social mobility, happiness, and economic growth.  As for developing societies, extreme inequality can lead to internal conflicts like civil wars and revolutions (p. 18-20). 

The arguments and evidence presented in this book are crucial to understanding the patterns of inequality and the possible subsequent cataclysmic events.  This book is more pertinent than ever because our time is a second Gilded Age.  We would be foolish to become complacent or accept our current, highly stratified society.  Finally, if we wish to understand why some societies prosper, we must ask why some fall. 

Mighty and persuasive

Even though the book is under the aegis of an academic press, replete with statistical graphs and charts, it is straightforward to read, regardless of previous economic or historical knowledge.  Scheidel fleshes out all theories, questions, and arguments with rich economic data, leaving no stone unturned.  To measure inequality, he uses the highly regarded Gini coefficient and the shares of income or wealth (p. 11); this refers to the market and disposable income (market income is pre-tax and transfer, disposable income is post-tax and transfer).  This approach makes the text standard and accessible to everyone. 

Scheidel is also forthright, acknowledging the limitations of his research.  For instance, he admits that there are data quality issues.  He explains that it is difficult to analyze and draw conclusions about inequality because the wealthy hide their income and wealth in secret offshore accounts.  Additionally, many historical records are of inadequate quality.  But he mentions these data are becoming more accurate thanks to initiatives like the “World Wealth and Income Database” (p. 14).  Moreover, Scheidel uses data proxies for various times and places to help gauge and evaluate landownership in Ancient Egypt and Rome, for instance, and relies on the findings of other scholars (p. 15).  These techniques make his overall argument and evidence dependable.

Have no fear, Scheidel is not Eurocentric.  Researchers and history enthusiasts can sigh with relief knowing that the author provides evidence from various societies, including lesser-known ones like the West African Oyo empire (p. 58).  The breadth of research demonstrates how stratification and violent upheavals are not unique to a particular group.  Instead, inequality affects all humans, past, present, and future.  It is this commonality that I hope readers understand so that we may move away from prejudicial explanations for dysfunctional societies and focus on more pertinent economic explanations that may help us formulate solutions to extreme inequality.

One minor qualm

I only have one minor qualm about one of the book’s theories.  In the beginning, Scheidel states, “Only health appears to be unaffected by the distribution of resources as such, as opposed to income levels: whereas health differences generate income inequality, the reverse remains unproven” (p. 20-21).  I do not believe this statement is entirely accurate.  Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir’s “Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much” (2013) and Keith Payne’s The Broken Ladder: How Inequality Affects the Way We Think, Live, and Die” (2017) prove otherwise.  Based on the research from these two books, inequality worsens individual health, cognition, and decision-making, which further exacerbates inequality, creating a vicious cycle for those already in relatively worse-off circumstances.  We cannot scrutinize Scheidel too severely since the latter book, which directly investigates inequality’s effects on health, was published the same year as Scheidel’s, but it is still worth acknowledging.

Essential facts about the text

There are always vital lessons that are worth sharing with a general audience.  Before delving into the most relevant lessons, it is crucial to acknowledge fundamental facts to understand the text better.

Land and livestock ownership and the intergenerational wealth transmission of the two were crucial determinants of inequality throughout history, especially early history (p. 37).  Imagine being an ancient Sumerian farmer and severe weather, climate, or disease decimated your livestock.  You would likely starve or become dependent on charity from others.  Consequently, your children would suffer now that they have less to inherit than the neighbours, even if the outcome was through no fault of your own.

The original one percent were elite groups vying to capture rents through making or taking, which usually required co-optation and cooperation (p. 47).  Capital accumulation, not labour and income, were inequality’s drivers since income in the ancient days was primarily the result of corruption, plunder, and extortion (p. 52), argues Scheidel.  The author argues that political power better explains vast fortunes and surplus wealth (p. 84).  It is an upsetting truth that may also explain inequality within most societies today.

As Scheidel writes, “the absence of major violent ruptures has been a vital precondition of high inequality” (bolding mine) (p. 62).  But, throughout history, inequality mostly remained flat or increased (p. 110).  For example, the US Civil War was more equalizing in the south than in the north since previous slave labour left and industry increased (p. 111).  The southern elite saw their income share significantly reduced with fewer indentured people to torture and exploit (p. 174-176).  I highly doubt that any person with a conscience would feel sorry for these elites owning less of the income share.

The concentration of wealth and income differed in scale and type, but the reasons for dis-equalization remained the same: intense economic growth, commerce, and urban growth (p. 89).  In other words, the development of economies and urban centres inevitably creates winners and losers for several reasons, unique to the time and place in question.  The winners can capture lucrative positions in the wake of changing dynamics. 

Key takeaways and lessons learned

I will outline five key lessons from this book I believe are vital for understanding societal success.

Inequality has been with us for a long time; it precedes civilization.  Though hunter-gatherer societies were less stratified than civilized, sedentary ones, it does not mean that they did not suffer from unjustified inequality.  Inequality was both transient and sporadic among hunter-gatherers (p. 33-34).  The discovery of the Sungir burials, about 120 miles north of Moscow, demonstrate that inequality has been with us since our humblest beginnings.  About 11,700 years old, the burials are of children containing elaborate artwork, like beads made of canine teeth.  These children did not work for their wealth and status; they inherited it.  Still, the case of these children can only lead us to conclude they were highly privileged by virtue of the family to which they belonged.  What does this say about our species?  We can at least acknowledge that someone’s higher outcome in life may not result from their physical or mental efforts or genius.  Sometimes, being born into the right family is all that matters.

Taxing the rich is better at financing war efforts than printing money.  Scheidel shows how the top 1, 0.1, and 0.001 percent saw their income decline precipitously during the war years of the 1930s and 1940s (p. 137).  Legislators understood a simple truth: wars require financing.  Capital owners usually avoid conscription, so they must contribute somehow, which means higher taxes.  No matter how painful it must be for the bourgeois to part with their cash, higher taxes are necessary for a country’s fate amidst a violent conflict.  During WWI, democracies like the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada chose to tax the rich while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia borrowed and printed money.  The result for the latter nations was too much inflation, which led to revolts amongst the masses (p. 146).  Though the consequences of this simple math seem obvious to contemporary readers, reminding ourselves of such cataclysmic events is necessary so that politicians and citizens may stop shedding a tear every time society forces a millionaire or billionaire capital owner to contribute more (proportionately and absolutely) to societal well-being.  Everyone’s survival depends on it.

Communism levelled societies relatively well, but that does not mean communist societies performed well economically.  After the Soviet Unions’ official dissolution in 1991, poverty rates shot up to a third of the population.  By the 1998 fiscal crisis, about sixty percent lived in poverty (p. 222).  The main point is that inequality will likely soar without levelling forces like violence and a combination of cronyism and market-set prices.  The author details other examples, including China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, and Cambodia, in “Chapter Seven: Communism,” demonstrating that the communists could accomplish their goal of levelling society through violence and revolution.  Unfortunately for those who lived under those circumstances, the communist approach often brought about everyone’s relative demise.

Plagues are not enough to level societies; politics and law also matter.  The Black Plague decreased the cost of land and increased the cost of labour since there were fewer disposable workers.  The effects of these changes levelled the economic situation in some parts of Europe and other areas (p. 292).  In a tellingly relevant example, the COVID-19 lockdowns dramatically shrunk the world’s labour markets since many workers were forced to stay home in the early months.  Similar to how workers’ wages during the Black Plague increased, many workers today demand higher salaries.  It may be too early to discern the impacts of lockdowns on wages across occupations and jurisdictions, but plagues must certainly accompany legal and political reforms to level societies adequately.  The Black Plague, however, did not level all of Europe.  Much of Eastern Europe experienced more stratification.  Eastern European elites, for instance, adopted serfdom, increased labour obligations, restricted peoples’ movements, and enforced tenant debt and mandatory payments.  These policies combined reduced the poor’s disposable income (p. 311-312).  Let us hope that today’s elites are not currently cooking up such schemes in the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression.  Average, working people could lose everything if influential people are uncareful.

The historical record shows that non-violent policies are not the greatest levellers.  Many believe that non-violent levellers are the best possible options for levelling societies.  They often include land reform (p. 353-355), emancipation (361-362), democracy (366), education and social welfare policies (p. 376), but their effects are unclear and goals never guaranteed (p. 399).  In many cases, elites are capable of recreating exploitative systems but just under different labels and means.  The premiums on high-skill education and training may plateau if too many highly educated and skilled people enter the labour market.  Earnings will always variate within and between occupations.  It does not help that the wealthy have the ears of politicians.  Wherever you live, your country’s elites aggressively lobby the government and contribute to political causes to curry favour and protect their status and power in society (p. 417).  A small, highly organized minority will always outpower a disorganized majority.  Maybe the solution is for the masses to be more demanding of expansive social welfare policies, but who knows what works.

Overall impression

Anyone concerned about the fate of their society in a world of increasing inequality should read “The Great Leveller.”  Readers will likely think of Karl Marx when leafing through its pages.  Though communism was a complete disaster for the countries that attempted it in the twentieth century, there is no doubt that some of Marx’s ideas remain relevant.  But it is difficult to believe that a violent revolution could ever resolve our issues, considering the advanced weaponry and surveillance technology that security services employ in first and third-world countries alike (p. 440). 

There are several other vital discussions in “The Great Leveler.”  For example, the role of executive compensation and unions (p. 150), enforced levelling by foreign, occupying governments (p. 124-127), immigration and inequality (p. 171), and even low-skilled labour and inequality (p. 172).  But you must read the book to learn about the societies, times, and places that experienced or prevented great levellers.  Everyone should ponder the examples and case studies Scheidel outlines, in addition to examining the statistical tables and charts to help formulate your own opinions.  He has written a splendidly persuasive masterpiece that will likely remain relevant for decades.