A review of Ian Morris’s “Why the West Rules – For Now.”

Morris, I.  (2010).  Why The West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of History and What They Reveal About the Future.  McClelland & Stewart Ltd.  750 pages.

Overview

Ian Morris’s Why the West Rules – For Now is an encapsulating book that offers a familiar but more rigorous explanation for Western global dominance.  He argues that geography was a significant factor in the West’s rise because it increased social development, changing geography’s meaning (p. 33).  The initial resources demanded thus change as previously limited regions may later become advantageous with advanced technology and organization (p. 33-34). 

Morris defines social development as “societies’ abilities to get things done – to shape their physical, economic, social, and intellectual environments to their own ends” (p. 24), such as organizational, technological and cultural accomplishments to reproduce, feed, clothe, and house themselves (p. 144).  Social development, however, is paradoxical because the forces that create it often create new cores of power, winners and losers, sometimes resulting in inequality, chaos and famine (p. 195).  To compare the developments across time and place, he uses his “Social Development Index,” which measures energy capture, urbanism (to gauge organizational ability), information processing (such as literacy, communication and science), and the capacity to make war (p. 147-149).  (Morris justifies these metrics according to six criteria outlined in chapter three, on page 147, for you nerds who like metrics and research methodology).

Morris takes an interdisciplinary approach to answer the book’s central question by piecing together data and information from various academic disciplines such as archaeology, biology, geography, history, and economics.  In doing so, he establishes a baseline of human history by going as far back as early humans like Homo erectus, Homo ergaster, the Neanderthals and, of course, Homo sapiens, and develops the story up until our contemporary age.  Regardless of any previous knowledge, you’ll get a sense of the arc of human history.

Morris defines the West as the societies that descend from the westernmost Eurasian core, the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East.  The East is Eurasia’s easternmost core, which developed between 8000 and 7500 BCE when rice cultivation started in the Yangtze Valley in modern-day China (p. 114).  This area became distinctive after 8000 BCE, with other agricultural cores appearing (p. 31-32), though some settlements go as far back as 12,700 BCE.  It is crucial to understand that the cores have shifted throughout history.  The Western core, for instance, started in the Middle East and gradually moved westward to Europe and eventually North America, where much of the global power is currently held (p. 160).  Morris rarely discusses the American, African and South Asian civilizations throughout the book, an unfortunate lacuna for this fascinating topic. 

Without laundry-listing the specific times, places, people and events that caused social development to either rise or decline (you should read the book for that), evaluating Morris’s main arguments requires considering the similarities and differences to common perspectives and critiques to his central thesis and approach. 

How is this book similar?

Like other scholars, Morris agrees that the abundance of domesticable plant and animal species in the Fertile Crescent was the primary catalyst for civilization’s initial takeoff (p. 117).  It is a persuasive argument considering the region’s plethora of geological and archeological evidence.

The discourse on Western supremacy becomes controversial for the period around 1500 CE. 

Morris supports the idea that Europe was a fractured continent made up of several autonomous, warring kingdoms and emerging states engaged in a fierce arms race which intensified local production for weapons and manufactures (p. 404), possibly explaining its initial takeoff.  The divisions in Europe lasted a long time.  They may explain why Christopher Columbus eventually found financial and political backing for sailing west from Europe and discovering the New World (p. 430); he had several monarchs he could persuade.  The same could not have happened in a unified China where centralized power and authority limited explorers’ options.  Again, another convincing stance considering how these kingdoms developed and how Columbus approached his issue. 

Morris also supports the argument that institutions matter for social development to flourish.  Eighteenth-century Britain overtook other European powers (and the world, for that matter) because of its inclusive institutions.  These inclusive institutions included weaker monarchies, freer merchants and higher wages.  However, Morris adds that geography played a role as well.  Britain, he explains, had abundant coal deposits, a vital source for an industrializing nation (p. 500).  Remember, development changes the meaning of geography since previously unusable resources become valuable with more advanced technology and an increased scientific understanding of nature.  In Britain’s case, it was the use of coal. 

How is this book different?

Morris rejects the racist biological argument for Western dominance, suggesting that Europeans were more genetically advanced than others.  He shares research indicating that the genetic variations amongst people are more similar than they are different (p. 73).  If the minor differences between populations were what mattered most, they would not be able to singularly explain why Eastern social development was higher than the West’s from around 540 CE (p.  331) and only started to close by 1290 CE (p. 392), eventually being overtaken in 1750 CE (p. 434).  Readers can appreciate his unapologetic stance on this issue since he says that “pronouncing racist theories contemptible is not enough” (p. 50-51); the theories must also be proven wrong.  Supporters of the genetic argument must specify genetic criteria that establish Europeans as superior life forms apart from the rest, which, so far, no one has accomplished.  More advanced genetic technology and screening may eventually prove the theory, much to the delight of racists, but that would require an immense amount of archaeological and genetic data from specific eras across continents and peoples.  To further complicate things, it would be impossible to come to a cogent explanation without also comparing the influence of political and economic institutions on peoples’ socioeconomic and health outcomes across populations.

Morris also disagrees that Greek democracy caused the West’s rule.  He maintains that ‘the West’ was a geographic place that shifted over time, not something distinguished by ideology or political organization like democracy.  He explains that democracy was never upheld or maintained after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire.  Democracy only resurfaced following the French and American revolutions (p. 260), so other variables require consideration to explain the considerable time gap.  On reading this, one can imagine how frustrated and offended some Western readers may become because the Middle East is technically part of Morris’s definition of ‘the West.’  You can imagine white nationalists seething right now.  Despite anyone’s indignation, Morris’s straightforward approach is helpful since it aids our understanding and ability to analyze the differences between Eastern and Western development throughout the ages.

Then, of course, is the cultural argument explaining the West’s rise.  The culture argument suggests that European culture was more rational and logical and that this would explain why the West began to overtake the world by around 1500.  The Chinese, its proponents say, had a lousy culture as reflected in their totalitarian, conformist institutions.  (Those interested in further investigating the cultural argument for Western domination should read The Wealth and Poverty of Nations by David Landes, a phenomenal book). 

To address the cultural claim, Morris has a nuanced approach, which is both one of the key strengths and weaknesses of his book.  He mentions the all too obvious fact that requires repeating: all cultures can be rational, mystical, relativist or authoritarian (p. 261).  Just consider the totalitarian Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War or religious zealots like televangelists and right-wing militias in the United States.  People, argues Morris, act in specific ways due to laziness, fear or greed (p. 89-91), often consequences of broader socioeconomic and geographic pressures (p. 568) of which we have little influence.  The book is brimming with examples to demonstrate this critical point.  One of the most important examples is Europe’s breakthrough with scientific thinking and methodology, known as the Scientific Revolution, starting in the seventeenth century. 

Morris claims that the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment were consequences of the West’s rising social development, not the causes.  Europeans, he explains, were forced to develop the appropriate naval technologies, measurements and standardization methods to access Eastern markets and goods (p. 476).  In the same period, the Chinese did not experience the same pressures because they already had access to the goods they needed since the most hotly demanded commodities were in their backyard.  What was not readily available was accessible via the land Silk Route, Indian Ocean and the South China Sea trade routes.  According to Morris, it would not have made sense for Chinese officials to continue Zheng He’s naval expeditions.  He says it would have been irresponsible and irrational for Chinese officials to set sail into the wide-open Pacific (p. 429).  The major flaw with this last point of the argument is that China never settled Taiwan, leaving many readers of history doubtful of the Chinese’s willingness and ability to navigate open waters, especially in those lumbering, hulking treasure fleets. 

Though Morris’s rejection of the culture hypothesis is persuasive, more than once, he meekly admits that culture can negatively influence a society’s outcomes.  But, he explains, culture is not the overriding cause of a nation’s rise or fall.  He says that “culture and free will never trump biology, sociology, and geography for long” (p. 571).  For example, when discussing the Muslim world’s changed attitude towards science and technology starting in the eighteenth century, it was likely due to military defeat and political issues.  As for the far East’s ‘bad’ culture, one could look to Emperor Kagnxi’s arrogance towards Western technologies, developments and science.  The emperor believed Western science useless and that foreign thinking and advancements originated from China.  His hostile attitudes towards novelty and modernity entrenched his country into studying ancient texts rather than seeking quantifiable explanations for observations and phenomena (p. 481). 

Another issue is that Morris does not thoroughly examine one of the most popular defences for the culture hypothesis: Max Weber’s argument about the Protestant work ethic (p. 20, and 136-137).  The Protestant Reformation was a momentous event often viewed as the catalyst separating the West from the rest because of changing attitudes and power politics.  Many believe the Protestant Work Ethic helped Europe develop appropriate commercial and scientific institutions and behaviours before non-European nations.  The book, though excellent, would have been much more convincing had Morris addressed the claim directly rather than merely mentioning it.

How is this book relevant?

“Why the West Rules – For Now” provides bountiful insight into how our species has adapted to recurrent obstacles and opportunities. 

One of the book’s most valuable contributions is the argument that people are more similar than they are different when analyzed as groups rather than as individuals.  Societies are never static.  It is too simple to unfairly judge another group simply because they are different, especially in an increasingly polarized world.  Morris reminds us that both the West and East developed along strikingly similar paths during their earliest stages.  For example, bot societies followed this pattern: plant cultivation, shrine building (religious and spiritual thought), fortification construction, creating proto-writing systems, developing large villages, domesticating animals, farming, and eventually creating cities (p. 130). 

Morris also shows readers that both Easterners and Westerners embraced ancient thought to cope with their harsh situations, whether suffering from famine, war, drought, or pestilence.  Twelfth-century Europeans looked to the past, particularly Rome, in the Renaissance (Rebirth), and Chinese intellectuals in the 1100s looked to Confucius thought (p. 419-426).  The events Morris shares demonstrate how humans, wherever they are, are always curious and driven to improve their lot because they are motivated by fear, laziness and greed. 

A subtler, though still informative perspective, is that humanity’s progress is not entirely dependent on a single individual since there are always others willing and able to take their place at a later date.  What matters are the broad, socioeconomic conditions in which people find themselves. 

Morris demonstrates why influential individuals are often overrated and why broader societal pressures are more important by exploring the similarities amongst some inventors and scientists.  For example, Alexander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray independently filed for a telephone patent in 1876 on the same day, and Joseph Priestley discovered oxygen in 1774, a year after a Swedish chemist (p. 567-568).  (Morris provides several other examples of people accomplishing the same feats independently).  This reality also goes beyond borders, as evidenced by Gu Yanwu’s meticulously recorded observations in Qing China in 1644 of the natural world to test theories and solve problems (p. 473-474); if the rest of China had accepted his approach, history could be very different.  It just shows us that our fate is not dependent on one person’s brilliance.  What matters is multiple thinkers eager to solve the same mysteries and challenges. 

History is replete with examples of how socioeconomic conditions influence culture and public consciousness.  Consider industrializing Britain.  Morris discusses how by the 1830s, British sympathy towards the poor and vulnerable, such as children working in factories, grew with the emerging middle class.  Consequently, there was an increased demand for labour regulation and protection against industry, and even the start of mass public education, benefiting all of society (p. 506).  In other words, our values change as our material world changes and likely vice versa. 

In today’s developed world, the middle class has shrunk drastically since the Information Communications Technology (ICT) Revolution starting in the late 1960s.  The losers of these changes are overwhelming moderately educated professionals engaged in laborious tasks and previously enjoyed secure pay and labour protections.  But this is no longer the case in an increasingly competitive, international market.  It is unsurprising that populism, polarization and resentment towards others and “the establishment” has grown alarmingly throughout North America and Europe – everyone needs a scapegoat.  One can only make educated guesses about how these attitudes may influence our institutions and legislation, the manifestations of a population’s feelings, desires and fears in traditionally liberal democracies. 

Nevertheless, despite our issues, there is reason to remain confident.  Different societies have demonstrated maturity and responsibility by putting their differences aside to unite against common threats.  Such was the case in 480 BCE when previously warring Greek city-states combined their military efforts to repel the encroaching Persians (p. 268).  Western governments today may have to bolster their alliances against emerging superpowers that do not regard democratic institutions or human rights in high esteem.  Or, perhaps, it could go beyond issues between societies.  Maybe world governments can work together to resolve global problems like pandemics or climate change.  Whatever the in-vogue issue may be, it is important to remain hopeful. 

Overall Impression

Morris has authored a compelling book.  Unlike other scholars attempting to answer why the West rules, Morris embraces a more mathematically rigorous and historically comprehensive approach demonstrating that geography explains the West’s rise over others and that this social development changes the meaning of geography.  Today, however, social development is also changing the meaning of biology.  Advancements in biotechnology and medicine are pushing the boundaries of the human body, a point he alludes to in the concluding chapters.  The culture hypothesis is a bit myopic and unhelpful, especially since it is difficult to benchmark quantitatively.  Even if the metrics used for his social development index are not one-hundred percent accurate, they are probably as precise as they will ever get until better research methods in geology, ecology, archeology, and cliometrics are developed.

This book is helpful for those interested in a more quantitative approach to Eurasian history.  Some background knowledge of the world’s major historical events is practical, particularly for the twentieth century since Morris rushes through these pivotal moments.  This book is not for you if you are looking for a book on American (i.e., North, Central and South America), South Asian (the Indian subcontinent), African, or Polynesian history.  There is too much to unpack.  Readers are encouraged to take their time and ponder how each kingdom, dynasty or city-state throughout the ages approached their obstacles differently for a more nuanced understanding of our development as a species. 

A few key takeaways from this book:

• we are more similar than we are different;

• societies have both risen and fallen several times since our hunter-gatherer days;

• all cultures and societies have blood on their hands;

• cores of power are constantly in flux;

• and, finally, we are more susceptible to broader forces than we may realize and like to admit. 

Thank you for reading.