Why the West is best
Niall Ferguson shows us why the West dominated the Rest in his masterful book, “Civilization.”
Cover of Niall Ferguson’s “Civilization: The West and the Rest”
Ferguson, N. (2011). Civilization: The West and the Rest. The Penguin Press. 402 pages.
Overview
The stark differences in living standards, power and economic dynamism between Western and non-Western societies are baffling. How did a minority of Western Europe’s population manage to control so much of the world? How did they come to dominate in science, technology, military power, global finance, and medicine? And when did it all happen? These are just some questions that Niall Ferguson, distinguished historian and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, asks in his 2011 book “Civilization: The West and the Rest.”
Ferguson’s central argument is that the West distinguished itself as a global power over the Rest due to the complexes of the institutions of competition, science, property rights, medicine, consumer society, and work ethic, in addition to the Rest’s inherent weaknesses (p. 12-13). He calls these six explanations “killer applications.” All of this is important since, as he claims, explaining the West’s rise over the Rest helps us estimate its possible decline and collapse (p. 18).
Ferguson defines civilization as “the single largest unit of human organization,” partly to address the challenges people face, such as the need to feed, water, shelter, and defend themselves. Civilizations often encompass linguistic, religious and cultural characteristics (p. 3). According to Ferguson, Western civilization is not necessarily a geographic distinction, contrary to Ian Morris’s definition in his book “Why the West Rules – for Now” (2010). Instead, Ferguson writes that Western civilization is “a set of norms behaviours and institutions” (p. 15), which include elements from ancient Rome like “democracy…athletics, arithmetic, civil law, geometry, the classical style of architecture and…words in modern English” (p. 17).
Western civilization’s domination originates in the late fifteenth century (p. 4). Several countries have adopted Western customs and institutions like free trade, parliamentary government, sports, and even clothing or decided to continue maintaining them after colonial imposition. The countries that genuinely appropriate these institutions, no doubt, are significantly better than those who reject them, despite this being a controversial stance that can result in some being dismissed from their academic posts.
Analysis
What I loved about the book
Ferguson makes a compelling case that the six killer applications determined the West’s dominance over the Rest, challenging other, more common arguments explaining its rise. The first common argument is that Europe rose because of imperialism and the subjugation of non-Western people. He explains this reasoning is flawed because, around 1500, the world’s major civilizations, such as the Ottoman Empire and Ming China, were equally, if not more so, technologically and militarily as powerful as the European civilizations (p. 11). They were not easily conquerable.
Critics also claim that the discovery of the Americas provided greater access to natural resources and human slave labour for European imperialists, which ushered in the Industrial Revolution. Though the additional capital certainly helped Europe post-1500, the origins of European industrialization predate New World colonization (p. 97), as evidenced by previous technological and economic innovations such as Johannes Gutenberg’s printing press (p. 63).
The second argument is that the West rose because of its geography, a widely accepted opinion credited to Jared Diamond in his seminal masterpiece “Guns, Germs, and Steel.” Ferguson does not deny the importance of geography, though he claims it is not entirely “sufficient” (p. 12). He agrees with Diamond that geography was influential. Europe’s populations were fragmented by rivers, mountain ranges and bodies of water, resulting in fervent competition amongst its semi-autonomous inhabitants and kingdoms. One nation could not completely overtake another because of these geographic boundaries, unlike China (p. 36). However, Ferguson correctly identifies the miseries wrought by warring Europeans in the 1600s, causing needless death and strife (p. 12).
The third argument Ferguson challenges is that institutions, which can be thought of as formalized norms, allowed the West to succeed over the Rest.
There is a convincing case supporting the role of inclusive institutions. Just look at the startling differences in living standards between communist North Korea and liberal capitalist South Korea. The former prioritizes elitism, the latter pluralism. Britain, however, is assumed to have risen over Western powers because of its sovereign parliament and common law tradition, allowing capitalism and industry to flourish. Ferguson challenges this theory, noting that the American, Dutch, French, and German legal traditions were like Britain’s. Therefore, institutions are only part of the answer, not the whole answer.
He claims Britain industrialized before others because expensive labour costs and the abundance of coal (a geographic determinant) incentivized the use of machinery to provide cheap, high-quality textile goods to ever-more demanding consumers (p. 203). It is an intriguing point since geography, in the sense of access to raw resources, will continue to play a vital role in a country’s development as science continues to push the frontiers of previously unusable materials.
Ferguson’s thesis is compelling and easy to understand, thanks to his comparative approach between the West and the Rest from 1500 onward. His approach demonstrates the depth of his knowledge and his pragmatism when navigating such a controversial topic. Many academics cower to explain why the West came to rule the rest after 1500. They fear it is too ‘Eurocentric’ or ‘anti-Orientalist.’ But Ferguson unapologetically addresses the question professionally and reasonably by highlighting the West’s shocking characteristics compared to the Rest.
He explains how the majority of the world’s population eats western-style foods, wears Western clothing, speaks Western languages, uses Western technologies, and organizes labour according to Western-style schedules (for example, eight hours a day and two to three weeks of vacation a year) (p. 8). Britain, the most successful colonial empire, controlled nearly a quarter of the world’s land surface and population just before the First World War in 1914 (p. 142). Together, eleven Western empires dominated about half of the world’s land surface and more than half of its population, in addition to controlling most economical production (p. 144).
Western scientific developments increased the sophistication of technologies, weaponry, medicine, production methods, and living standards that the Rest could never have fathomed. Ferguson shares the fascinating case of how better diets improved the stature and longevity of English convicts so much that, in 1600, they were slightly more than five inches taller than the average Japanese soldier. He beautifully phrases this observation by saying, “when East met West by that time, they could no longer look one another straight in the eye” (p. 46). Considering the degrees of influence and power obtained by one set of societies over others, it would be a disservice to all historians and economists to reject the book’s central question on the grounds of it potentially being offensive.
It is also essential to understand how the Rest made mistakes and why they did not rise. Ferguson focuses on how China and the Middle Eastern empires brought about their demise.
China, once an exemplar of a high-tech society before 1500, erroneously turned inward. While Europeans set sail and discovered new lands and people, China, despite its naval strength, banned foreign ocean-going explorations even after they established trade routes with parts of Africa and Indonesian islands. Further solidifying their demise, China disregarded more innovative developments abroad (p. 47). Chinese politics and lack of curiosity and ambition, after the death of Emperor Yongle in 1424, had disastrous long-term effects. They were unable to compete with foreign aggressors, as evidenced in their humiliating defeat by the British in the Opium Wars due to inferior weaponry and organization.
The Ottomans, too, rejected scientific and technological developments, notably the printing press, despite their earlier exposure to this crucial tool before Europeans. In addition to irresponsible borrowing from European lenders and frequent infighting, the religious zeal of the Ottoman Empire’s ruling elite led to the banning of books, printing presses and the persecution of ‘freethinkers’ engaged in scientific pursuits (p. 67-68). Consequently, the Muslim world failed to develop scientific breakthroughs. The West, meanwhile, moved forward. It is an embarrassing moment of their past, especially since the Muslim world had provided Europeans with science and technology only they could devise. Today, the Muslim world still lags behind the West, and religious influence in politics and science has much to do with their limited results.
Ferguson’s argument that the consumer society helped the West rise above the Rest is by far his most persuasive case. The consumer society is essentially Western popular culture, extending through goods and services, predicated on the value of freedom and democracy, the ability to choose and live your life to your own volition (p. 198).
Though its origins lie in the Industrial Revolution, consumer society and the West’s dominance were evident during the Cold War between the free United States and the unfree Soviet Union (p. 244) because non-western people gleefully adopted Western culture. The Soviet bloc and the Rest appropriated everything from music, fast food, movies or, most visibly, clothing. Consumer society’s distinguishing factor is that the Rest embraced it. Unlike Western political, religious or legal institutions, the consumer society was not forced onto colonized people.
Ferguson highlights a fascinating example to demonstrate the consumer society: jeans. Jeans, a western invention, were a controversial item in the Soviet Union because they represented youth and rebellion. He explains how jeans had to be smuggled behind the Iron Curtain because the nationalized Soviet industries could not produce goods consumers wanted and needed (p. 249) – so much for intellectuals and elites who supposedly ‘know better.’ More importantly, jeans represented freedom of expression, consciousness and sexuality, powerful symbols threatening the Rest’s logic. Before, the West would subjugate people through hard power. Now, the West won over their hearts and minds with their culture.
Despite the undeniable strengths of the arguments and case studies, Ferguson occasionally introduces unnecessary information that serves the reader’s musings more than providing substance to his central argument.
Minor issues about the book
In chapter four, on medicine as a killer application (which is just the application of ‘science,’ the second killer application), Ferguson explores the French Revolution at length, for about nineteen pages, before finally making a tenuous connection to its importance for medicinal development in colonial Senegal. The argument goes that France’s civilization mission in Africa – mission civilisatrice – faced almost certain defeat without developing medicines since the climate and species in west Africa were hostile to European and African bodies (p. 168). By setting up medical testing grounds, building railway infrastructure and training Africans themselves, the French eventually penetrated the heart of Africa while other European colonials lagged. These actions benefited both colonized and European peoples.
He is likely correct. The French Revolution is, of course, a vital turning point in history. But Ferguson could have omitted the revolution entirely and instead elaborated and compared other European countries’ medical developments. A more focused analysis and comparison of the most impactful medications, devices, best practices, and standards between Europeans would have painted a clearer picture of how medicine evolved over the centuries, ultimately resulting in higher living standards and the West’s continued rise over the Rest.
Chapter six, on work ethic as a killer application, is another unconvincing argument for the West’s rise because it lacks details. Ferguson argues that a stronger work ethic was associated with Protestantism (259), a popular view often rarely and poorly challenged. He supports Max Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic theory, claiming self-study of the Bible encouraged greater literacy and the accumulation of human capital in Protestant communities relative to Catholic ones in Europe (p. 263). Additionally, he shares information suggesting that Protestant missionaries in the colonies better served their subjects by encouraging literacy, which resulted in better economic performance post-colonial independence. Most importantly, Protestantism supposedly fosters trust between fellow Protestants, creating a self-enriching circle of honest, hard work amongst business partners, clients and producers, allowing the communities to accumulate their savings (p. 264).
The supporting arguments are probably valid, but the biggest issue is that Ferguson does not adequately define work ethic. If anything, Ferguson is, perhaps, referring to the number of hours worked as ‘work ethic’; the more one works, the greater their work ethic. Citing the World Values Survey and Christian Research’s data to determine religiosity, Ferguson illustrates that a decline in religious beliefs coincides with decreased hours worked (p. 266). For example, religiosity and hours worked have decreased in the West, while Protestantism grows in some areas of China, where they generally work more hours than Westerners. However, this analysis may be slightly misleading.
Readers may have preferred statistical analysis measuring the relationship between church service attendance and hours worked, for example, assuming a data set like this exists. Additionally, these data do not differentiate between religions within areas. Some readers may wrongly believe that the correlation between hours worked and religiosity is a causal factor for increased work ethic. Moreover, some industries may benefit from fewer hours and higher pay; this seems to be the trend for many developed countries, especially those working in tech or the service sector. The same cannot be said for factories and labour, however. Extra rest may make people more productive. Lastly, the greater trust between Protestants in China may be a matter of trust towards the in-group, an observation that can likely be seen among other non-Protestant groups and individuals. It would not be unreasonable to expect higher amounts of trust and cooperation between group members when they conduct business with their kind, regardless of religiosity. Additionally, Chinese workers toil for long hours and are not nearly as religious as some Western societies, such as the United States. All this begs the question: what about the work ethic in other, non-religious countries where Protestants don’t make up a large portion of the labour force, like Japan?
The chapter could have been better if it had focused on more tangible sub-topics within labour economics. Topics to explore could have included: labour laws between countries; the presence, number and strength of unions; the standardization of work schedules (as mentioned briefly earlier in the book); business cultures and expectations of employees (China, with its large labour force and limited ability to mobilize, may not develop the same labour safeguards as Western countries); and the influence of different types of occupations and industries on work practices.
Analyzing the topics above would have made for a far more compelling case. Just think of the tech companies in Silicon Valley. It would be relevant seeing how many large companies seem to ‘pamper’ their employees with benefits, flexible and reduced work hours, and even positive office spaces to ensure their loyalty and productivity.
The last major issue with the book is Ferguson’s rant on page 288, which seems to be a call for Westerners to improve themselves, considering the West’s supposed impending doom in the wake of China’s rise. He complains about high taxation, the decline of religion and spirituality, the rise of “post-modern cults,” and how too few western students study STEM disciplines. He is impartial and academic throughout the book, but he shows his right-leaning bias at this point.
His concern for taxes is unclear and debatable; some developed societies are perfectly happy with higher taxation because they expect more from their governments, which is entirely up to them. The post-modernist cults are, indeed, not nearly as emotionally powerful as the Protestant ethic, I’ll admit; they also don’t seem to accomplish much of what they claim to resolve. But are we worse off without the Protestant Work Ethic or religion? Probably not. You do not need religion to continue to read books, work hard, connect with others respectfully, and save and invest your money responsibly. However, his concern for our students is more than reasonable since we must remain competitive in this ever-globalizing economy when several rising countries are outproducing us in STEM professionals.
Ferguson, like other scholars, is right to worry over China’s rise, considering its awful human rights record and growing economic and political dominance. However, as he explains, there is still hope for the West so long as we overcome our pusillanimity and resolve our most significant threats and failings (p. 324).
Overall Impression
This book is a masterpiece. It succinctly articulates six reasons why the West is better than the Rest.
Attempting to explain why the West rose over others is no easy feat. It is arguably the most important question in human history for the past millennium. Anyone interested in history, real politick and competition, in general, should read this book.
Today, the Western world is viewed negatively by both Westerners and non-Westerners. Too many people dedicate their careers and spare time lambasting everything related to Western culture, literature, history, morals, legal, and political systems because of the past atrocities committed against non-European peoples. Criticism, of course, is necessary since it highlights potential issues and serves as a starting point for us to make improvements. But, sometimes, it can become a bit ridiculous, as is plainly evident when viewing and listening to post-modern activists on Western university campuses today. To be clear, Ferguson does not shy away from discussing the tragedies and horrors of slavery (such as in the southern US) or colonial genocide (such as in German-occupied Namibia). He is more than respectful when acknowledging the plight of others, never glorifying violence and never demeaning the victims.
Anti-Western attitudes are not merely confined to academia but are pervasive throughout our media and entertainment as well. Those who choose to defend or even acknowledge the positive contributions (and there are many) of Western civilization become pariahs. Despite this issue, everyone will learn valuable insights from this book regardless of their interests. Much of the content remains relevant, though some of the author’s predictions for 2020 may no longer be accurate, given the unpredictable pandemic.
The most valuable takeaway from this book is that the Western template of governance and economic organization is, so far, the most effective model known. Statesmen and stateswomen who reject this model will fare worse than those who embrace its principles. Acknowledging this will certainly offend post-modernists and, ironically, Western university students. But it does not change the fact that the principles underpinning western civilization have advanced our species’ potential both on earth and space.
It is not entirely a question of race, genetics, IQ, biology, or geography. Any country can emulate the West’s practices and reap the benefits themselves, whether free markets, the rule of law, or democracy. Several countries have already done so, like Japan and South Korea, and Brazil and India are getting there, so long as they can maintain the momentum. Embracing Western principles may be a bumpy and challenging path, a tough pill to swallow for many post-colonial societies. Still, it’s probably better than reverting to traditional, ineffective customs and institutions if they wish to improve their standard of living and global prominence.