A true diplomat
What we can learn from Lester Pearson’s leadership in John English’s second biographical volume, “The Worldly Years”
Cover of “The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson: Volume II: 1949-1972” by John English
English, J. (1992). The Worldly Years: The Life Of Lester Pearson: Volume II: 1949-1972 (Vol. 2). Alfred A. Knopf Canada. 473 pages.
Overview
Millions of people travel through Toronto’s Lester Bowles Pearson International Airport each year, but how many of them, and Canadians in particular, know the person bearing the airport’s name? Pearson (23 April 1897 to 27 December 1972), or ‘Mike,’ as was his nickname, was Canada’s 14th Prime Minister from 22 April 1963 to 20 April 1968, following an already successful career as a Member of Parliament (MP) and cabinet minister.
One of Canada’s finest historians, John English, illuminates Pearson’s incredible and accomplished life in two volumes: Shadow of Heaven (1989) and The Worldly Years (1992). His penetrating analysis provides readers with comprehensive insight into the layers and nuances of Pearson’s complex character. Arguably the most influential Canadian Prime Minister of the post-WWII era, Pearson’s diplomacy cemented his standing as a world leader, thrusted Canada into the twentieth century through social welfare reform, and improved the country’s status among powerful nations globally. There is no doubt that historians and international policy enthusiasts will mull over his legacy for decades.
This review only pertains to the second volume. It focuses on the leadership lessons I gleaned and found most important from Pearson’s life and time in public office. As mentioned elsewhere on this site, wherever there are reviews for autobiographies, biographies, or memoirs, I intend to find inspiration and life advice where self-help books often fail.
Key leadership lessons from Pearson’s life
Be mindful of your biases and the limits of your knowledge, no matter how successful you were in the past. Previous success in one arena does not necessarily transfer well to another, which was undoubtedly the case for Pearson. As John English writes, “nothing ever worked out too well in the West’s efforts to contain Communism in Asia” and that “after 1949, Mike’s diplomatic skills…were tested so often in an area whose history he barely knew and whose diplomats were mostly nameless faces at international gatherings.” (p. 31). He adds that “Pearson approached Asia with a Eurocentric vision, and it affected deeply the way he saw the dramatic events in East Asia in the 1940s” (p. 32). No matter how noble, Pearson’s efforts demonstrate how context always matters. The fact is that even if the skills may seem relevant, such as diplomatic and negotiation skills in his case, they may be ineffective without substantial knowledge of the people, culture, language, and overall character and minutiae of the new issues and people at hand. Regardless of one’s profession, it is crucial to question one’s biases and utilize additional mental heuristics to comprehend complex situations. Different perspectives are always helpful, but they are also limited if many details of a given case are unknown. Always question what you know and do not know and strive to learn something new.
Freedom can create exceptional leaders. Pearson was allowed considerable freedom to manage his work as External Affairs Minister under Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, which may explain why he was successful for most of his career (p. 49). A small, often overlooked lesson remains relevant today: micromanagers asphyxiate the talents, strengths, and contributions of some of their best employees and peers. Sometimes, it is best to provide direction and clarity and allow people to manage their workloads to their accord. Of course, these arrangements do not apply to all industries and professions. Factory workers or line workers, for instance, must fulfill a specified role in a particular time and place and complete a quantifiable set of tasks at a certain level of quality to ensure an organization’s overall success. And to complicate matters, providing greater leeway to cabinet ministers in today’s age may not be an option, considering the ever-increasing control of the cabinet and the bureaucracy in Canada’s political landscape. (read Donald J. Savoie’s “What is Government Good At?” (2017) for more information on the concentration of political power in Canada since the late twentieth century). Nonetheless, giving people the freedom to work, experiment, learn, and grow may pay dividends.
Greatness in one thing may mean sacrificing greatness in another. Political life is incredibly demanding of one’s time, energy, and attention. As is the case for most politicians, Pearson was rarely granted respite for his career. He felt he had failed as a father and never lived up to the expectations he saw in his father, despite his best efforts to maintain communication and contact with his children. For example, Pearson felt an unhealthy amount of regret for missing so many of his children’s important milestones, like birthdays and graduations. His daughter, Patricia Pearson, had even said that the “family relationship had to be lived so much in our minds and hearts” (p. 74) because of his frequent absences. There are people with exceptional skills and talents, making them the envy of the world, yet many forget that no one’s good at everything when spread too thin. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs, especially with time. Someone who spends an hour after work practicing an instrument because they enjoy the experience means they have one hour less for ‘more productive’ activities. We all have twenty-four hours in the day, and how we allocate these hours influences our outcomes. Pearson dedicated more time to his work and was largely successful, but he missed out on those cherished family opportunities.
Do not underestimate others simply because they are unlike yourself or do not ascribe to your ideals. The election of John Diefenbaker as the Conservative party leader in December 1956 relieved the Liberal elite because they believed he was too unrefined and un-gentlemanly to threaten their political standing. “Despite their worldly sophistication and their brilliance,” writes English, “there were forces that they [Liberals] could neither understand nor counter” (p. 162). The winds of political change in Canada were blowing: Diefenbaker was elected Prime Minister in June 1957, and St. Laurent was out. Canadians made it loud and clear that they wanted “a government more willing to heed other voices, a government with the air of the corner store, not the Senior Common Room” (p. 183), explains English. Even when Pearson took the Liberal Party helm on 16 January 1958, he and his party suffered their worst loss on 31 March 1958, winning a meagre forty-nine seats (p. 202).
The above case demonstrates why it’s important to read the room and never underestimate your opponents based on preconceived notions. Diefenbaker was certainly gregarious and demagogic, but he was more grounded than Pearson, who made wild promises to increase social welfare and simultaneously lower taxes. Canadians had had enough of the quixotic proposals. But there is another vital lesson in this story: down does not mean out. Pearson refused to be “the Liberal Party’s greatest failure” (p. 203), so he committed to rebuilding the party immediately after his loss. He continued to learn and grow on the way, and, after two failed attempts, he became Prime Minister in 1963. As we are all aware, failure is inevitable, but it is worth the reminder.
According to English, as Prime Minister, Pearson delegated responsibilities like a senior partner at a law firm: “He gave general direction but no detailed advice” (p. 284). Pearson did not focus too much on social and economic policy, as evidenced in his memoirs. Military and foreign affairs policy occupied his mind and consequently his actions. When trouble was afoot in a department, Tom Kent, a dependable advisor to Pearson, was there to resolve the issue
Going against the grain might be warranted, despite the potential fallout among your allies. The amicable relationship between Pearson and US president John F. Kennedy was long gone following his assassination and when Lyndon B. Johnson became president in 1963. Pearson and Johnson did not get along, to say the least. Their political views, especially concerning the Vietnam War, were diametrically opposed. During his acceptance of the Temple University World Peace Award on 2 April 1965, Pearson suggested in his speech that Johnson stop bombing the North Vietnamese because the time had come to negotiate peace (p. 362). Johnson was furious, feeling betrayed since he wanted to continue the bombing campaign. He chewed Pearson out over the phone and in-person shortly after, dominating the conversation (as he always did, even before the incident) refusing to let Pearson explain himself (p. 363). These events soured Canadian-US relationships for the remainder of Pearson’s and Johnson’s work relationship.
T some point in our lives, we must all work with people we do not like or with whom we do not agree. But that does not mean we should sit by twiddling our thumbs, being yes people to superiors or brash colleagues. Pearson’s firm stance is laudable. LBJ’s policies and bombing campaigns did not necessarily represent all Americans’ opinions, let alone those in his government. For example, Senator William Fulbright privately wrote to Pearson about how many people approve of Pearson’s speeches about Vietnam, noting that “Not all Americans are idiots” (p. 376). Additionally, Pearson’s approach may appear weak in the eyes of some anti-liberals, but his actions signified his refusal to let Ottawa be a lapdog or mouthpiece for Washington (p. 372). Pearson was pragmatic. Compared to Johnson’s impractical and asinine belief that continuously bombing the North Vietnamese would resolve everything, Pearson understood what mattered and how the world worked.
In good time, Pearson’s efforts shaped Canadian identity around the globe. To conclude, as English explains in beautiful prose:
Canadians suddenly began to sense that they did matter. The lighting of the centennial flame in 1967 had somehow cleared away some of the dark clouds that had hovered above Canadian political and national life for so long. As the centennial winter became glorious summer, millions of Canadians went on pilgrimages within their own land and seemed to see it anew…Canadians mattered, not as citizens of a superpower whose sway was enormous, but as a people who might yet find a better way (p. 380).
When reading the above passage, I cannot help but wonder: do Canadians feel the same today?
Other significant contributions of this book
John English’s second volume of the Pearson biographical series is helpful for those looking for leadership lessons and anyone willing to learn more about the following subjects:
Pearson’s strategy to save NATO from entanglement in global decolonization efforts (p. 114-116).
An in-depth analysis of the Suez Canal Crisis (end of Chapter Four). English discusses the critiques and kudos of Pearson’s actions and why the crisis can be considered a success or failure; the author considers it a success (p. 130).
Pearson’s stance on nuclear arms and the Bomarc Missile Crisis (p. 250-252). As supplementary content, check out this gem from the CBC’s radio archives: https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/1963-diefenbaker-government-collapses.
English’s commentary on George Grant’s “Lament for a Nation” (1965). Grant’s book was prevalent among Canadian conservative circles, and English explains why Grant’s analysis is a bit erroneous (start of Chapter Eight, but especially p. 257).
The rise of Quebec nationalism under Jean Lesage, le père of the Quiet Revolution (Chapter Eight).
Pearson’s views on federalism and confederation, notably his concern with the “compact” theory (p. 299-303).
And, finally, the former French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle’s influence on Canadian identity politics (much of Chapter Nine).
Who should read this book?
This book is not for you if you are looking for a definitive source on Canada’s nascent social welfare reforms in the 1960s and how the minority-led Pearson Liberals championed it with pressure and cooperation from Tommy Douglass’s New Democratic Party. John English briefly mentions Pearson’s social welfare policy accomplishments in Chapter Nine, such as pension plans, student loans, youth allowances, regional development funds, and other programs (p. 307), but the debates and developments of the programs are not explored at length.
Most of the book focuses on Pearson’s diplomacy and mediation regarding his foreign affairs profile. Pearson, after all, is widely known for these accomplishments.
I recommend reading this second part of the biography for anyone already familiar with Canada’s post-war history and looking for additional, more in-depth analyses regarding international affairs. The book can sometimes be challenging to read and comprehend due to the lack of subheadings and the meshing of several topics under one chapter. Even though English was a federal Liberal Party MP in the 1990s, fear not: his analyses of the events in Pearson’s time treat all groups and individuals fairly and respectfully. He carefully strikes a balance when presenting contradictory facts and opinions and draws valuable insights for anyone wishing to learn more about Canada’s post-war developments, particularly on the complexity of diplomacy.